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1Measuring the Performance of Corporate Acquisitions:
An Empirical Comparison of Alternative Metrics
Summary
The choice of performance measure has long been a difficult issue facing researchers. This
paper investigates the comparability of four common measures of acquisition performance:
cumulative abnormal returns, managers’ assessments, divestment data and expert informants’
assessments. Independently each of these measures indicated a mean acquisition success rate
of between 44%-56%, within a sample of British cross-border acquisitions. However, with
the exception of a positive relationship between managers’ and expert informants’ subjective
assessments, no significant correlation was found between the performance data generated by
the alternative metrics. In particular, ex-ante capital market reactions to an acquisition
announcement exhibited little relation to corporate managers’ ex-post assessment. This is
seen to reflect the information asymmetry that can exist between investors and company
management, particularly regarding implementation aspects. Overall, the results suggest that
future acquisitions studies should consider employing multiple performance measures in order
to gain a holistic view of outcome, while in the longer term opportunities remain to identify and
refine improved metrics.
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2Introduction
The choice of performance measure has long been a difficult issue facing researchers within the
organisational field (Dess and Robinson, 1984; Glaister and Buckley, 1998; Kirchhoff, 1977).
Finance and associated disciplines have relied on objective performance metrics such as share
price movements and accounting data to assess the outcome of organisational choices. Others,
for example organisational behaviour and strategic management, have frequently relied on
subjective performance indicators, including managers’ self reports. In some instances the use
of a subjective measure has been justified by difficulties in obtaining objective data, for example
because the focal unit was a constituent part of a larger organisation (Dess and Robinson, 1984).
The selection of appropriate performance metrics is of particular relevance in inter-disciplinary
fields such as mergers and acquisitions, where diverse origins have led to the adoption of a
broad range of performance measures within contemporary research (Larsson and Finkelstein,
1999). This is especially notable within studies that have investigated the antecedents of
acquisition outcome (King, Dalton, Daily and Covin, 2004). Some have employed subjective
performance assessments obtained from managers involved in the acquisition (e.g. Brock,
2005; Capron, 1999), or from external expert informants (e.g. Cannella and Hambrick, 1993;
Hayward, 2002). Others have relied on objective measures including the acquirer’s
stockmarket returns (e.g. Carow, Heron and Saxton, 2004; Datta and Puia, 1995), or
profitability gains (e.g. Hitt, Harrison, Ireland and Best, 1998). Others still have focused on
whether the acquired firm is subsequently divested (e.g. Bergh, 1997; Porter, 1987).
The widespread use of alternative performance measures means prospective acquisitions
researchers face a dilemma when selecting an appropriate performance variable. Indeed,
authors of two recent meta-analyses, concerned with identifying the antecedents of
3acquisition outcome, caution that inconsistent use of the available performance measures may
have held back knowledge development (King et al., 2004; Stahl and Voigt, 2004). Further,
some of the conflicting conclusions within the acquisitions literature may be due, in part, to
the adoption of different performance metrics. For example, the contradictory findings of
Datta and Puia (1995) and Morosini, Shane and Singh (1998) on the impact of national culture
distance on acquisition outcome arise from studies that employed different performance
measures. The role of acquisition experience is another subject characterised by differing
results and the use of a variety of performance metrics (e.g. Hayward, 2002; Hitt et al., 1998).
Against this background, the paper presents an empirical comparison of four alternative
measures of acquisition performance. The broad proposition investigated is that there is
convergence between the performance data generated by the alternative metrics. The findings
contribute to our knowledge in three areas. First, they provide insights into the comparability
of subjective and objective measures of acquisition performance, in particular how ex-ante
capital market expectations relate to managers’ perceptions of ex-post acquisition outcome.
This is relevant to the interpretation of prior acquisitions studies that have employed different
performance metrics. Second, the findings provide indications as to how future researchers
might approach the measurement of acquisition performance. Finally, the findings add
empirical data on the mixed absolute performance of cross-border acquisitions, an
increasingly important form of corporate development (UNCTAD, 2000).
The origins and assumptions of each of the performance measures examined are summarised in
Table 1, together with their strengths and weaknesses, and examples of studies that have
employed the measure.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
4Methodology
The study’s sample comprised 61 British acquisitions of continental European firms made
between 1988 and 1990, identified from Acquisitions Monthly magazine. Inclusion in the
sample was dependent upon meeting four criteria: the purchase was of a controlling interest
(>50%), the bid value was at least £5m1, performance data were attainable using at least three
of the metrics listed below, and the acquisition was classified as horizontal as defined by two-
digit SIC codes2.
For each acquisition in the sample, separate performance data were gathered via the following
four methodologies:
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) were calculated from the acquiring firm’s daily share
price movements around the announcement date of the acquisition (day 0, identified from
Acquisitions Monthly). Standard event study methodology using the market and risk adjusted
model was employed, where the abnormal return is computed as:
ARit = Rit – (ai + bi Rmt)
Where,
ARit = the abnormal share price return of acquiring firm i on day t
Rit = observed share price return of acquiring firm i on day t
ai = market model constant for acquiring firm i
bi = beta of acquiring firm i
1 Very small acquisitions were excluded consistent with recent acquisitions studies in the finance literature
employing abnormal returns methodology (e.g. Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2006). The final sample ranged in bid
value from £5m to £530m, with a mean of £58m.
2 Horizontal acquisitions provided a reasonably homogeneous environment in which to compare the performance
measures. The focus on horizontal acquisitions is consistent with much of the recent strategic management
research on acquisitions (e.g. Brock, 2005; Capron, 1999; Capron and Pieste, 2002; Ellis and Lamont, 2004;
Schoenberg, 2004).
5Rmt = share price return on the market portfolio on day t
Coefficients a and b were estimated over a three month period (-120 to -30 days), and were
taken to calculate the expected returns for each security given movements in the market
portfolio, here the FTSE All-Share Index. Abnormal returns due to the acquisition
announcement were determined by subtracting the actual share returns from the expected
returns. These were calculated over a 21 day period spanning the bid announcement (day -10 to
+10) to provide the CAR for each acquisition. Use of a 21 day event period follows previous
acquisitions research (e.g. Datta and Puia, 1995; Markides and Ittner, 1994), and provides an
event period sufficiently long to capture market reaction, yet short enough to avoid the influence
of information unrelated to the announcement3.
Managers’ Subjective Assessments were gathered by postal questionnaire 3 to 5 years
following acquisition completion. The respondents were current executive directors of the
acquiring firm, who had also been serving as directors at the time of the acquisition. The
questionnaire instrument was adapted from Datta (1991) and comprised nine performance
criteria4. Respondents were asked to indicate, using five point Likert scales, the importance
assigned to each performance criterion at the time of acquisition, and the acquisition’s
performance relative to their expectations. A ‘weighted performance’ for each criterion was
established by multiplying the performance score by the importance attributed to the criterion.
The scale exhibited high reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha=0.86) and principal components analysis
3 Abnormal returns using a two day event period (-1,0) were also calculated for each acquisition. The use of this
data in the comparative analysis yielded qualitatively similar results to those obtained with the (-10, +10) CARs.
4 The criteria were: return on investment, return on sales, asset utilisation, earnings per share; share price; cash
flow; tax efficiency; growth in sales revenues; purchase of undervalued assets.
6confirmed its uni-dimensionality. A single mean “managers’ assessment” performance score
was therefore computed for each acquisition5.
Questionnaire responses from more than one acquiring firm director were available for 24 of the
acquisitions. Cognisant of the limitations of relying on the response of a single manager
(Bowman and Ambrosini, 1997), inter-rater reliabilities were calculated using Kendall’s
Coefficient of Concordance for the 24 multiple respondent acquisitions (following Hayward,
2002), revealing a mean Concordance Coefficient of 0.73 between respondents. The high inter-
rater reliabilities provide reassurance that the questionnaire responses captured a valid
organisational view of acquisition performance, rather than that of one individual.
A potential limitation of this methodology is its reliance on managers’ retrospective recall of
the original acquisition criteria (Miller, Cardinal and Glick, 1997). The maximum five year
recall period adopted here is not considered excessive. First, the respondents were directors,
who are credited with high intellectual capabilities and thus a strong ability to recall events
(Huber and Power, 1985). Second, acquisitions are major organisational events, which tend
to be recalled more accurately and completely (Huber and Power, 1985). These two points,
combined with the high levels of inter-rater reliabilities, provide confidence towards the
retrospective data in the present case.
Expert Informants’ Subjective Assessments were based on financial press commentary that
appeared between two and four years post-acquisition, following methodology established by
Datta and Grant (1990). Financial press reports on each acquisition were retrieved using the
5 In a separate question, respondents also provided their “overall” rating of the acquisition’s performance. The
“managers’ assessment” score, computed from the nine item scale, exhibited very high consistency with their
“overall” performance rating (r=0.92; p<0.001).
7“FACTIVA” database. The performance of the acquisition implied by the press commentary
was rated on a scale of 1 (very poor) to 5 (very good) by two independent Professors of Strategic
Management. The Professors level of agreement was high (r=0.82; p<0.001), and their
aggregate rating was used in subsequent analysis.
Divestment Data captured the ownership of the acquired company at 13 years post-acquisition,
consistent with the timeframes employed in prior research (Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992;
Montgomery and Wilson, 1986; Porter, 1987). It was also measured at six and nine years to
gain insight into divestment patterns and provide greater comparability with the timeframes of
the other ex-post performance metrics examined in this study. For each of the years, the
acquisition was coded 0 if it was still retained by the acquiring company, coded 1 if it was
divested6. Ownership of the acquired firm was tracked using databases including “FAME”,
“FACTIVA”, and “Who Owns Whom”. Where no, or conflicting, information was available,
the acquiring company was contacted to ascertain ownership of the acquired firm, and, if
divested, the year of divestiture.
Results and Discussion
Performance of the Acquisitions
Table 2 summarises the performance of the acquisitions using each of the four alternative
metrics.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
6 Defined as the divestiture of all assets and product lines of the acquired entity (Kaplan and Weisback, 1992).
8The mean CAR for the 21 day period around the acquisitions’ announcement was -0.02% (s.d.=
6.43%), and not statistically different from zero (t = -0.02). The acquisition announcement
produced positive abnormal returns for the acquirer in 50% of cases, and negative returns in
50%. These results are in line with larger studies of UK acquisitions employing short-run
abnormal returns methodology (Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2006).
Managers’ subjective assessments reveal that 44% are dissatisfied or highly dissatisfied with
their acquisitions financial performance relative to their expectations. This echoes Rostand’s
(1994) findings where 45% of acquiring managers stated that their European cross-border
acquisitions had not met their strategic objectives.
Expert informants’ assessments classified 44% of the acquisitions as poor or very poor
performers.
Finally, 11% of acquisitions in the sample were subsequently divested within six years, rising to
30% after nine years, and 56% after 13 years7. Examination of the complete dataset showed
that the average time period to divestment was nine years following completion, similar to that
reported by Montgomery and Wilson (1986). The divestment rate of 56% after 13 years is
comparable to that identified in US related acquisitions (Porter, 1987).
In summary, the absolute performance of acquisitions in this sample is similar to that reported
by prior studies. Interestingly, irrespective of which performance metric is employed, the
overall success rate was in the region of the widely cited 50% (Brouthers et al., 1998). The
7 31% of the acquiring companies were themselves acquired by year 13. In just over one third of these cases the
original acquisition was divested by the new owner. These divestments are included in the overall 56%.
9paper now turns to the comparability between the performance measures, is it the same 50%
that are categorised as successful in all cases?
Comparability of the Performance Measures
Statistical comparison of the four sets of performance data were undertaken using Spearman
rank-order correlations, following Glaister and Buckley (1998) 8. The results are summarised in
Table 3.
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
High levels of agreement were found between managers’ subjective performance assessments
and those of expert informants. This is perhaps unsurprising given that financial journalists
frequently gather their information through briefings given by the acquiring managers.
The divestment data exhibited no statistically significant association with either managers’
subjective assessments or expert informants’ views, regardless of the time period. The
arguments of those who view divestment as a measure of acquisition performance would lead us
to expect a strong association between managers’ assessment of performance and their
subsequent decision to retain or divest the business (Porter, 1987). The observed weak
correlations suggest this association does not hold in practice. Indeed, inspection of the data
relating to divestments within the first six years, i.e. broadly coincident to the time period in
which the managers’ assessments were collected, revealed that 29% of these divestments related
to acquisitions that were viewed as very successful by the managers themselves (>=4.0 on the
Likert scale). Overall, these results support the view that rather than failure, divestment in some
8 Pearson correlations and Chi-Square statistics were also computed and produced findings consistent with the
Spearman-based results.
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instances signals successful restructure and profitable sale (Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992), or
appropriate resource reconfiguration in response to environmental change (Capron et al., 2001).
Finally, the capital market’s initial assessment of an acquisition, based on CAR methodology,
exhibited no statistically significant relationship with either the objective divestment data or the
two subjective performance measures. This finding is seen to reflect the contrast between the
ex-ante nature of the CAR measure and the importance of the post-acquisition integration
period, captured by the three ex-post performance measures investigated here.
The CAR metric is based on investors’ forecasts of the future cash flow consequences of an
acquisition announcement. The lack of correlation between this measure and those
performance data collected ex-post supports Larsson and Finkelstein’s (1999) proposition that
investors may have difficulty in accurately judging the internal implementation issues that can
accompany an acquisition. The integration phase of an acquisition is central to its outcome
(Ellis and Lamont, 2004), but even acquiring managers have difficulty predicting all the
issues that will arise (Very and Schweiger, 2001). For example, longitudinal research has
revealed that issues of cultural compatibility are frequently formalised and rise in intensity
only as the implementation progresses (Kavanagh and Ashkanasy, 2006). Remote external
investors therefore face considerable difficulty in forecasting internal organisational matters
that might arise post-acquisition. This lack of insight into the implementation phase may lead
investors to consistently make erroneous estimates of the future cash flow implications of an
acquisition announcement9.
9 These arguments assume capital market efficiency; that all information publicly available to investors is
accurately reflected in the share price. Evidence for market efficiency is available in the finance literature, as
reviewed by Cuthbertson and Nitzsche (2004).
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Conclusion
This study has investigated the comparability of four measures of acquisition performance.
Individually each measure confirmed an average success rate for cross-border acquisitions of
approximately 50%. However, with the exception of a positive relationship between
managers’ and expert informants’ subjective assessments, there was no comparability
between the performance data generated by the alternative metrics. These results highlight the
dangers inherent in comparing studies that have employed different performance measures.
This may help to explain some of the conflicting conclusions reported in the literature
examining the antecedents of acquisition performance.
Looking forward, the lack of comparability suggests that future empirical work should consider
employing multiple measures of acquisition performance. Acquisitions impact a range of
stakeholders in differential ways. For example, capital market investors are frequently
concerned with the immediate wealth effects of an acquisition announcement (King et al.,
2004), the bidding firm with the acquisition’s long-term outcome (Hitt et al., 1998), and
employees with anticipated job losses and acculturative stress (Cartwright and Cooper, 1990).
Adopting multiple performance measures would facilitate a more holistic view of acquisition
outcome that takes account of a range of stakeholders. These comments are especially relevant
to studies that investigate the antecedents of acquisition outcome, where the current lack of
consistency of performance metrics is notable (King et al., 2004; Stahl and Voigt, 2004). It
may be insightful for such studies to employ both ex-ante and ex-post assessments, to capture
the initial capital market reaction and the longer-term outcome for the acquiring firm taking into
account the integration experience.
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Regarding ex-ante measures, announcement CARs, by definition, capture the immediate
shareholder wealth effects and investors’ expectations. However, the results reported here
suggest that where the longer-term outcome of the acquisition is also of interest CARs need to
be complemented with an appropriate ex-post performance measure. This is especially the case
where the research focus is on organisational or implementation factors, due to the information
asymmetries discussed above. Future methodological studies could investigate expert
informants as an alternative source of ex-ante assessments, for example experienced industry
sector analysts who hold insights into both financial and operational implications.
In terms of ex-post outcome, the results confirm that divestment is unlikely to be a valid
performance indicator. Managers’ subjective assessments may provide a suitable ex-post
measure, particularly where multiple respondents are utilised for each case to improve reliability
and establish an organisational perspective. Steps should also be taken to ensure that
respondents are familiar with the complete history of the acquisition. If these conditions are
met, managers’ assessments hold the advantage of providing a direct measure of outcome as
perceived by the acquiring firm (Brouthers et al., 1998). Expert informants’ provide an
alternative subjective metric, and the correlation with managers’ data points to their utility when
the latter cannot be obtained (e.g. due to executive departure). Again, multiple informants
should be employed to raise reliability.
The timescale of ex-post measurement is a further consideration. Sufficient time must be
allowed for post-acquisition integration, while, for subjective measures, avoiding memory decay
in recalling the original acquisition objectives. A review of the 9 studies cited in Table 1 as
employing subjective ex-post measures, revealed average elapsed times prior to data collection
of 3 years minimum to 5 years maximum following acquisition completion. This provides a
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useful benchmark given its consistency with managers’ own 2-3 year timescale for performance
delivery (Norburn and Schoenberg, 1994) and recommendations on the use of retrospective
reports (Huber and Power, 1985).
More fundamentally, the results suggest opportunities remain to identify and refine improved
measures of acquisition performance. This includes ex-ante measures (e.g. based on expert
informants), but applies particularly to objective ex-post indicators. For example, some have
argued that the realisation of acquisition synergies are best reflected in long-term accounting
measures (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1989; Hitt et al., 1998). Although no accounting metric
was included in this comparison, due to the cross-border sample and concerns with the
comparability of accounting data (Meeks and Meeks, 1981; Walton, 1992), future
methodological studies could usefully include accounting based measures, specifically those
which overcome the established difficulties in disaggregating the performance of an
individual acquisition from consolidated accounts (Montgomery and Wilson, 1986; Larsson
and Finkelstein, 1999). Similarly, novel measures of synergy realisation may provide avenues
for future research, for example direct quantification of post-acquisition resource redeployment.
Future studies might also include more diverse samples than the horizontal cross-border
acquisitions employed here, to examine whether the comparability of metrics is influenced by
acquisition characteristics.
While this study has focused on the measurement of acquisition performance, the need to
employ and refine valid and reliable measures, and develop consistency within
interdisciplinary areas, has relevance to many organisational fields (e.g. Jones and
Dimitriatos, 2004). As such this study has provided a cautionary note regarding the
comparability of different performance metrics and hopes to encourage further work on the
14
topic.
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Table 1: Qualitative Comparison of Four Measures of Acquisition Performance
Measure Underlying rationale/assumptions of the
measure
Strengths of the measure Weaknesses of the measure Examples of studies
using the measure
Cumulative
abnormal
returns
Origins in the financial economics literature,
assesses the impact of an event (acquisition
announcement) on a firm’s share price by
estimating the “normal” or expected return to
its share in the absence of an event and
comparing it to the actual return achieved
during a period of time around the event
(Fama et al., 1969).
Strategic management studies generally utilise
event windows around the acquisition
announcement (e.g. -10,+10 days), providing
ex-ante performance forecasts from the
perspective of acquiring firm shareholders.
Finance studies have also employed long run
event windows (e.g. 0, +36 months. See
Sudarsanam and Mahate (2006; appendix) for
a useful discussion on long run abnormal
returns methodology).
Assumes capital market efficiency, such that
share price movements in response to the
event accurately reflect investors’ assessment
of the future cash flow implications of the
transaction.
Capital market provides a fully
objective assessment (Lubatkin and
Shrieves, 1986).
No possibility of bias from firm
executives, and share prices “see
through” accounting manipulation
(Lubatkin and Shrieves, 1986).
Share price movements represent the
only direct measure of shareholder
value (Lubatkin and Shrieves, 1986).
Limited to cases where the acquiring
firm is publicly quoted.
Does not measure realised operating
performance, but investors’ forecast
of the future cash flow implications
of the acquisition (Montgomery and
Wilson, 1986).
Share price movements may reflect
other actions of the firm extraneous
to the event. Particularly an issue for
long run CARs, whose use is
generally limited to large acquisitions
(Lubatkin and Shrieves, 1986).
Results obtained may be subject to
technical aspects of the
computational procedure, including
choice of daily vs monthly share data
(Lukatkin and Shrieves, 1986), the
relevance of the benchmark market
index (Gregory, 1997), and the
appropriateness of the event period
(Lubatkin and Shrieves, 1986).
Capron and Pistre, 2002
Carow et al., 2004
Datta and Puia, 1995
Gregory, 1997
Hayward, 2002
Markides and Ittner,
1994
Sudarsanam and
Mahate, 2006
Managers’
subjective
assessments
Origins in the management literature as an
operationalisation of a multidimensional
performance construct (Mahoney, 1967).
Executives are asked to rate the extent to
which their original objectives (for the
acquisition) have been met along a number of
specified dimensions.
A separate single question asking executives
to rate their satisfaction with the “overall”
Allows a composite view of
performance that takes into account
differing management objectives
(Brouthers et al., 1998).
Applicable across all types of
acquisitions.
Managers’ perceptions define their
reality and influence their behaviour
May be subject to managerial bias
(Lubatkin and Shrieves, 1986).
Assessment may be idiosyncratic to
the individual manager providing the
information (Bowman and
Ambrosini, 1997).
Dependant upon accurate
retrospective recall of respondents
Brock, 2005
Brouthers et al., 1998
Capron, 1999
Datta, 1991
Datta and Grant, 1990
Schoenberg, 2004
Very et al., 1997
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performance is also frequently employed to
establish convergent validity (Dess and
Robinson, 1984).
Most commonly used to capture the
perspective of acquiring firm management
(Brouthers et al., 1998); some studies have
employed views of acquired firm executives
(Brock, 2005; Very et al., 1997).
Data usually gathered 3-5 years after event,
providing ex-post assessment.
and attitudes (Krug and Hegarty,
2001).
Can be utilised where objective
measures are not available (Dess and
Robinson, 1984).
(Miller et al., 1997).
Results may be subject to
respondents’ familiarity with the
original objectives of acquisition
(Datta, 1991).
Expert
informants’
subjective
assessments
A variant of the above, this seeks the views of
expert informants as to the acquisition’s
performance, typically using direct data from
stock market analysts (Haywood, 2002), or
indirectly via the rating of financial press
reports and commentary (Datta and Grant,
1990; Datta, 1991).
Provides external assessment that is
“independent” of both management
and capital providers.
Can be utilised where both managers’
own assessments and objective
performance measures are
unavailable (Cannella and Hambrick,
1993).
May reflect the expert informant’s
subjective bias and may be
impressionistic (Cannella and
Hambrick, 1993).
Data may be subject to differences in
the experts understanding of the
definitions or bases on which they are
making performance judgements
(Cannella and Hambrick, 1993).
Cannella and Hambrick,
1993
Datta, 1991
Datta and Grant, 1990
Hayward, 2002
Divestment Origins in the industrial organisation and
business policy literature, this measure
identifies whether an acquired firm has
subsequently been divested, with divestment
deemed to show managements’ dissatisfaction
with the acquisition’s performance
(Montgomery and Wilson, 1986; Ravenscraft
and Scherer, 1987).
“The underlying assumption is that a company
will generally not divest or close down a
successful business except in a comparatively
few special cases” (Porter, 1987: 47).
“A relatively simple way to gauge
success” (Porter, 1987: 47), that does
not require detailed financial
information.
Coarse-grained measure. Divestment
may indicate strategic failure (Porter,
1987), but equally may indicate
profit taking following successful
restructure (Kaplan and Weisbach,
1992), or appropriate resource
reconfiguration in response to
environmental change (Capron et al.,
2001).
Bergh, 1997
Montgomery and
Wilson, 1986
Porter, 1987
Ravenscraft and
Scherer, 1987
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Table 2: Acquisition Performance from Alternative Measures
Measure Mean Standard
Deviation
% Successful % Unsuccessful
Announcement
CARsa
-0.02% 6.43% 50%
(+ve CAR)
50%
(-ve CAR)
Managers’
Assessmentb
2.99 1.03 56%
(Neut to Hi Satis)
44%
(Hi Disatis to Disatis)
Expert
Informants’
Assessmentc
2.74 1.01 56%
(Neut to V.Good)
44%
(V.Poor to Poor)
Subsequent
Divestment d:
13 years
9 years
6 years
(0/1 variable) (0/1 variable) 44%
70%
89%
56%
30%
11%
a. Acquisitions characterised as successful where CAR was positive, unsuccessful where CAR was negative.
b. Data represent weighted mean scores on scale of 1.0 to 5.0, calculated from questionnaire responses.
Acquisitions characterised as successful where weighted mean score >=3.0, unsuccessful where score <3.0.
c. Independent assessment of press commentary on scale of 1.0 to 5.0. Acquisitions characterised as successful
where mean score >=3.0, unsuccessful where score <3.0.
d. Divestment of the acquired firm by year n was taken to signify an unsuccessful acquisition (coded 1), retention
a successful acquisition (coded 0).
Table 3: Spearman Rank-Order Correlations Among Alternative Acquisition Performance
Measures
Announcement
CARs
Managers’
Subjective
Assessment
Expert
Informants’
Assessment
Announcement CARs -
Managers’ Subjective
Assessment
0.15 -
Expert Informants’
Assessment
0.17 0.62*** -
Divestment: 13 years
9 years
6 years
-0.20
-0.07
-0.21
-0.19
-0.13
-0.21
0.09
-0.10
-0.21
***p<0.001.
